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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge 
 We consider here a constitutional challenge to 
Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rule 204, which allows 
experienced attorneys to be admitted to the Pennsylvania bar 
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without taking the Pennsylvania bar exam provided they are 
barred in a “reciprocal state,” that is, a state that similarly 
admits Pennsylvania attorneys by motion without requiring 
them to take that state’s bar exam.  In a thorough and well-
reasoned opinion, the District Court upheld Rule 204, and we 
will affirm. 
I. Background 
Rule 204 allows an attorney to join the Pennsylvania 
bar by motion, without taking the Pennsylvania bar exam, if 
the attorney has graduated from an accredited law school, has 
either passed the bar exam or practiced law for the “major 
portion” of five of the preceding seven years in a reciprocal 
state, remains a member in good standing of every bar to 
which the attorney has been admitted, obtains a favorable 
moral character determination in Pennsylvania, achieves a 
sufficient score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Exam, and has not previously failed the Pennsylvania bar 
exam.  See Pa. Bar Admission Rule 204(1)-(8).  Thirty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia have reciprocity 
agreements with Pennsylvania.  In addition, Pennsylvania 
allows attorneys admitted in any state to apply for pro hac 
vice admission, i.e., to be “specially admitted to the bar of 
th[e] Commonwealth for purposes limited to a particular 
case.”  Pa. Bar Admission Rule 301. 
Appellants Richard Rosario, Paul Riviere, and the 
National Association for the Advancement of 
Multijurisdictional Practice (“NAAMJP”) filed this suit 
against Appellees, who are Justices of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court responsible for promulgating Rule 204.  
Rosario graduated from an accredited law school in Maryland 
and is admitted to practice law in Maryland and Washington, 
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D.C.  He applied for admission to the Pennsylvania bar but 
was rejected because Maryland is not a reciprocal state and 
because he had not taken the District of Columbia bar exam 
or devoted the requisite amount of time to practicing law 
there.  Riviere is a member of the New Jersey bar, another 
non-reciprocal state.  He asserts that he wants to apply for 
reciprocal admission in Pennsylvania but has not because he 
would be rejected.  Both Rosario and Riviere are members of 
NAAMJP, an organization dedicated to extending reciprocal 
bar admission to additional states.   
Appellants contend Rule 204 violates the Equal 
Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for Appellees, and Appellants filed a timely 
appeal.1 
                                              
1 The District Court, after a careful analysis, found that 
both Rosario and Riviere have standing to press their claims 
because their alleged injury—denial of admission to the 
Pennsylvania bar—is concrete and particularized; caused by 
Rule 204; actual and imminent; and redressable by the 
remedy sought in this suit.  See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement 
of Multijurisdictional Practice (NAAMJP) v. Castille, 66 F. 
Supp. 3d 633, 639-40 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  Additionally, the 
District Court found that NAAMJP could establish 
associational standing under Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).  See 
NAAMJP, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 642.  We are satisfied that at least 
one Appellant has standing, allowing us to proceed to the 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.  Gonzalez v. Sec’y of 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 III. Discussion 
 A. Fourteenth Amendment  
 We begin with Appellants’ argument that Rule 204 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and 
Privileges or Immunities Clauses.  We confronted a similar 
challenge in Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 
1992).  There, we reviewed Pennsylvania Bar Admission 
Rule 203, which permits graduates of unaccredited law 
schools to sit for the Pennsylvania bar exam if they are 
members of the bar of, and have practiced law for five years 
in, a reciprocal state, but not if their admission and five years 
of practice are in a non-reciprocal state.  Id. at 1264. 
The plaintiffs in Schumacher graduated from an 
unaccredited California law school, passed the California bar 
exam, practiced law in California for five years, and remained 
members in good standing of the California bar, but because 
California is a nonreciprocal state, the plaintiffs were 
ineligible to sit for the Pennsylvania bar exam.  They argued 
                                                                                                     
merits.  See Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1264 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 
(1986)). 
6 
 
that Rule 203 violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
“substantially interfere[d] with their fundamental right to 
interstate travel by discouraging them from moving to 
Pennsylvania” and urged us to apply strict scrutiny, although 
they also argued that Rule 203 could not survive rational 
basis review.  Id. at 1265.  We rejected both contentions, 
concluding that rational basis review applied because Rule 
203 “neither establishes a classification based on residency 
nor erects a barrier to migration,” and that Rule 203 passed 
that review because “Pennsylvania has a legitimate interest in 
securing mutual treatment for . . . its attorneys seeking 
admission to the bars of other states.”  Id. at 1268, 1272.  “By 
allowing attorneys who are graduates of unaccredited law 
schools from reciprocal states to sit for its bar examination,” 
we observed, “Pennsylvania may entice states to enter into 
reciprocal agreements with it.”  Id. at 1272.  
We reach the same conclusion here.  Rule 204 does not 
classify attorneys based on residency, but rather, their state of 
bar admission, and it does not erect a barrier to migration.  
See id. at 1267-68 (“Surely, the Rule has some deterrent 
effect on nonresident attorneys who wish to migrate to 
Pennsylvania but choose not to because they are ineligible to 
sit for the Pennsylvania bar examination.  However, the 
Constitution does not guarantee that citizens of State A may 
move to State B and enjoy the same privileges they did as 
citizens of State A, only that citizens of State A may move to 
State B and be treated on similar terms as the citizens of State 
B.”).  It also does not classify applicants based upon 
“inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or 
alienage.”  Id. at 1266 (internal quotation mark omitted).  As 
a result, Rule 204 is subject to rational basis review, and, like 
Rule 203, it furthers Pennsylvania’s legitimate interest in 
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securing favorable treatment for attorneys admitted in 
Pennsylvania if and when they seek to join the bars of other 
states (which, in turn, might motivate more attorneys to seek 
admission in Pennsylvania, increasing access to legal services 
for citizens of the Commonwealth).  We thus reject 
Appellants’ Equal Protection Clause challenge, and, for the 
same reasons, we reject their Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities Clause challenge.  See Connelly v. 
Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citing Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1266) (reviewing Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities 
claims “under the same standard”).   
 B. First Amendment  
 Appellants next argue that Rule 204 infringes upon 
various rights protected by the First Amendment, including 
free speech, free association, and the right to petition.   
  1. Freedom of Speech  
 We must first determine what level of scrutiny applies 
to the purported restriction on speech.  Appellants contend 
Rule 204 constitutes content and viewpoint discrimination, 
which are both, as a general matter, subject to strict scrutiny.  
See Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 193 (3d Cir. 
2008).  They also argue that Rule 204 is an unlawful 
restriction on professional speech, seeking to analogize it to 
the law we confronted in King v. Governor of New Jersey, 
767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2048 
(2015).  King involved a challenge to a New Jersey statute 
prohibiting licensed counselors from engaging in “sexual 
orientation change efforts” with a client under the age of 
eighteen.  Id. at 220.  While we upheld the statute, we 
8 
 
concluded such counseling constituted professional speech 
and explained that “a prohibition of professional speech is 
permissible only if it ‘directly advances’ the State’s 
‘substantial’ interest in protecting clients from ineffective or 
harmful professional services, and is ‘not more extensive than 
necessary to serve that interest.’”  Id. at 235 (quoting Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).     
 Appellees ask us to instead treat Rule 204 as a time, 
place, and manner restriction on speech, as the Ninth Circuit 
did in a case related to this one involving an Arizona rule 
identical to Rule 204.  See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of 
Multijurisdictional Practice v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037, 1047 
(9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2374 (2015).  Such 
restrictions are valid provided “[1] [that] the restrictions are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication.”  Melrose, 
Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 388 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(first, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 We disagree with both parties’ characterizations.  First, 
Rule 204 does not discriminate on the basis of the subject 
matter or viewpoint of any bar applicant’s speech, the area of 
law an applicant would practice, or the clients an applicant 
would represent.  In fact, nothing in the record suggests that 
Pennsylvania is even aware of the views of the Appellants or 
any other applicant, or of what applicants will say or do 
during their legal careers.  Therefore, Rule 204 does not “pass 
judgment on the content of [any] speech.”  Thomas v. Chi. 
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Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002); see also Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) [hereinafter 
“TBS”] (“[L]aws that confer benefits or impose burdens on 
speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are 
in most instances content neutral.”).   
Neither does Rule 204 regulate when, where, or how 
attorneys speak, nor does it prohibit a category of 
professional speech like the statute at issue in King.  Rather, 
the only restriction Rule 204 imposes on Appellants is that 
they must take the Pennsylvania bar exam or apply for pro 
hac vice status to practice law in Pennsylvania.  Thus, the rule 
also cannot be pegged as a time, place, and manner 
restriction. 
 Instead, we conclude Rule 204 is an exercise of 
Pennsylvania’s “broad power to establish standards for 
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of 
professions.”  King, 767 F.3d at 229 (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Because it regulates only the requirements 
for obtaining a license to practice law and does not “restrict[] 
what a professional can and cannot say,” Rule 204 does not 
“create[] a ‘collision between the power of government to 
license and regulate those who would pursue a profession or 
vocation and the rights of freedom of speech . . . guaranteed 
by the First Amendment.’”  Id. (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 
U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)).   
It has long been true that “[a] State can require high 
standards of qualification, such as good moral character or 
proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the 
bar,” so long as any requirement has “a rational connection 
with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law.”  
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Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 
(1957).  While Schware itself involved a Due Process 
challenge rather than a First Amendment one, the influential 
opinions of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516 (1945), and Justice White in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 
(1985), that were central to our decision in King (as well as 
recent professional speech cases from other Circuits) make 
clear that the same analysis applies.  See King, 767 F.3d at 
229-31; see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (White, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“Regulations on entry into a profession, as a 
general matter, are constitutional if they ‘have a rational 
connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice’ 
the profession.” (quoting Schware, 353 U.S. at 239)); Collins, 
323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A state may forbid 
one without its license to practice law as a vocation . . . .”).   
In sum, because Rule 204 is not a prohibition or other 
restriction on professional speech, but rather, a content-
neutral licensing requirement for the practice of law, it is 
valid under the First Amendment if it has a rational 
connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice 
the profession.  Rule 204 easily passes this test.   
While Appellants raise intriguing arguments as to the 
virtues of the bar exam requirement, they cannot meet their 
burden of “negati[ng] every conceivable basis which might 
support [the rule], whether or not the basis has a foundation in 
the record.”  Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch, 666 F.3d 
862, 876 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 321, 
320-21 (1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
Ultimately, it is not our role to “judge the wisdom, fairness, 
or logic of legislative choices.”  Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 
198, 202 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 
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Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
While according to Appellants, Appellees have 
conceded that Rule 204 “has nothing to do with [attorney] 
competence or client protection in Pennsylvania,” Appellant’s 
Br. 6, Appellees have done no such thing.  It is true that the 
parties stipulated that “Pennsylvania’s interest in the 
reciprocity provision is to ease the burden of bar admission 
for Pennsylvania attorneys seeking to practice law in other 
states.”  App. 52 (emphasis added).  But the relevant feature 
of Rule 204 in determining whether the Rule imposes an 
unlawful restriction on Appellants’ speech is the requirement 
that, if they do not meet its requirements, they must take the 
Pennsylvania bar exam or apply for pro hac vice admission to 
practice law in Pennsylvania.  Appellees certainly have not 
admitted that the bar exam or pro hac vice requirements have 
nothing to do with client protection.  Appellants’ quarrel with 
the waiver of those requirements for certain attorneys must be 
viewed as an argument that Rule 204 is underinclusive or 
discriminatory (an argument we discuss and reject below), not 
that the Rule has nothing whatsoever to do with client 
protection. 
Accordingly, our suggestion in King that “[a] state law 
[prohibiting professional speech] may be subject to strict 
scrutiny if designed to advance an interest unrelated to client 
protection” has no bearing here.  See 767 F.3d at 235.  
Additionally, our conclusion in Schumacher that 
Pennsylvania’s decision to prevent graduates of unaccredited 
law schools barred in nonreciprocal states from taking the 
Pennsylvania bar exam did not “promote[] Pennsylvania’s 
interest in ensuring a competent bar,” 965 F.2d at 1270 n.11, 
does not compel a different result.  Schumacher involved an 
12 
 
Equal Protection challenge, so our focus was on the different 
treatment of members of reciprocal and nonreciprocal bars, 
see id. at 1266, 1269-70, as was our focus here in rejecting 
Appellants’ own Equal Protection arguments, see supra pp. 4-
6.  For First Amendment purposes, however, our focus is on 
the restriction on speech, if any, and any challenge to an 
allegedly disparate application of that restriction must be 
analyzed as a question of underinclusiveness or content or 
viewpoint discrimination.   
Pennsylvania’s decision to allow experienced attorneys 
in reciprocal states, but not nonreciprocal states, to apply for 
admission by motion does not undermine Rule 204’s rational 
basis on either underinclusiveness or content or viewpoint 
discrimination grounds.  Even if that decision rendered Rule 
204 underinclusive, the Rule could nevertheless survive 
rational basis review, especially because accommodating 
attorneys admitted in reciprocal states furthers the legitimate 
“secondary objective[s]” of securing favorable treatment for 
attorneys admitted in Pennsylvania and making admission to 
the Pennsylvania bar more attractive.  See Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979).  And despite Appellants’ claims to 
the contrary, the fact that attorneys of reciprocal states face 
fewer hurdles to admission than attorneys of nonreciprocal 
states does not constitute speaker discrimination.  Speaker-
partial laws trigger heightened scrutiny only “when they 
reflect the Government’s preference for the substance of what 
the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to what the 
disfavored speakers have to stay).”  TBS, 512 U.S. at 658;2 
                                              
 2 Appellants are correct that TBS applied intermediate 
scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, after rejecting strict 
scrutiny.  See TBS, 512 U.S. at 661-62.  TBS involved the 
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see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 
U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to 
differential tax treatment of veterans groups and other 
charitable organizations absent any “indication that the statute 
was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that 
it has had that effect”); cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 340 (2010) (explaining that “attempts to disfavor certain 
subjects or viewpoints” and “restrictions distinguishing 
among different speakers” are “interrelated,” as “[s]peech 
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too 
often simply a means to control content”).  Rather, as we have 
noted, Rule 204 does not reward, punish, or even 
acknowledge the content or viewpoint of any attorney’s 
speech.         
Finally, we reject Appellants’ contention the Rule 204 
places an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, as 
                                                                                                     
“must-carry” provisions of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which require cable 
television systems to devote a portion of their channels to the 
transmission of local broadcast stations.  Id. at 626.  The 
Court characterized those provisions as “content-neutral 
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech,” and 
concluded they deserved the same scrutiny as the time, place, 
and manner restrictions at issue in Ward and the prohibition 
on burning Selective Service registration cards at issue in 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  TBS, 512 
U.S. at 661-62 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799; O’Brien, 391 
U.S. at 377).  TBS does not support the notion, however, that 
intermediate scrutiny applies to professional licensing 
requirements.   
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Pennsylvania does not “determine whether [an] applicant” 
should be admitted “on the basis of its review of the content” 
of the applicant’s speech.  Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 
420 U.S. 546, 554 (1975).  Indeed, Rule 204 does not compel 
speakers to seek approval before they engage in any particular 
speech, but instead, imposes general prerequisites to 
practicing law in Pennsylvania.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 335.  Moreover, the rule does not give officials “unbridled 
discretion” to prohibit speech, City of Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988), as it provides 
objective criteria for admission, and all admissions decisions 
are subject to judicial review, see Pa. Bar Admission Rules 
204, 222.  In sum, we conclude that Rule 204 does not violate 
the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.3 
 2. Freedom of Association 
 Appellants next assert that Rule 204 violates their 
freedom of association.  There are two such freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment: “intimate association and 
expressive association.”  Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984)).  
Appellants invoke only the latter, arguing that Rule 204 
imposes penalties and withholds benefits because of their 
membership in the bars of nonreciprocal states.  We outlined 
a three-step process for analyzing an expressive association 
claim in Pi Lambda Phi:  First, we consider “whether the 
group making the claim engaged in expressive association”; 
                                              
 3 The District Court rejected Appellants’ argument that 
Rule 204 is unconstitutionally overbroad.  Because 
Appellants have not challenged that conclusion on appeal, we 
will not disturb it. 
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second, we ask “whether the state action at issue significantly 
affected the group’s ability to advocate its viewpoints”; and 
third, we “weigh[] the state’s interest implicated in its action 
against the burden imposed on the associational expression to 
determine if the state interest justified the burden.”  Id. at 442 
(citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)).  
 Assuming, without deciding, that Appellants are 
members of a group that “engage[s] in constitutionally 
protected expressive association,” Rule 204 does not 
“significantly affect[]” their ability to advocate any 
viewpoints.  Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 445.  It does not 
“require [Appellants] to associate with anyone,” nor is it 
“directed on its face at [their] expressive or associational 
activities.”  Id. at 446.  Again, Appellants are able to practice 
law in Pennsylvania if they take the Pennsylvania bar exam or 
apply for pro hac vice admission.  As a result, any impact on 
Appellants’ expressive activities is “indirect and attenuated” 
and “do[es] not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”  
Id. at 438-39 (citing Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 
697, 706 (1986)).  Thus, Rule 204 does not violate 
Appellants’ freedom of association.  Accord Berch, 773 F.3d 
at 1047-48. 
  3. Right to Petition  
 Lastly, we reject Appellants’ claim that Rule 204 is an 
impermissible violation of their First Amendment right to 
“petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  The Petition Clause “protects the right of 
individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established 
by the government for resolution of legal disputes.”  Borough 
of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011).  
Appellants provide no support for the proposition that the 
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Petition Clause protects the right of an attorney to appeal to 
courts or other forums on behalf of another.  Further, they 
maintain the right to represent clients in Pennsylvania courts 
so long as they take the bar exam or apply for pro hac vice 
admission.  See Berch, 773 F.3d at 1048.  Simply put, Rule 
204 does not violate the First Amendment.  
 C. Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause 
 Appellants next argue that Rule 204 violates Article 
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause by depriving them of 
the right to practice law in Pennsylvania.  See U.S. Const. art. 
IV, § 2.   While Appellants are correct that the practice of law 
is a fundamental right for Privileges and Immunities 
purposes, see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 
281 (1985), the Clause does not foreclose a state’s ability to 
treat residents and nonresidents differently, Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489, 502 (1999).  It bars only “discrimination against 
citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason 
for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are 
citizens of other States.”  Id. (internal quotation mark 
omitted).   
In Tolchin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 
1099 (3d Cir. 1997), we established a two-part inquiry to 
evaluate a Privileges and Immunities claim:  First, does the 
challenged rule discriminate against nonresidents?  Id. at 
1113.  Second, if it does, is the imposition too heavy a burden 
on the privileges of nonresidents, and does it bear a 
substantial relationship to the state’s objective?  Id.  Under 
this test, Rule 204 does not contravene Article IV’s Privileges 
and Immunities Clause because it treats Pennsylvania 
residents no differently than out-of-state residents.  Rule 204 
inquires not into an applicant’s state of residency, but rather, 
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his or her state of bar membership.  For example, a 
Pennsylvania resident barred only in New Jersey would, like 
a New Jersey resident barred only in New Jersey, be unable to 
join the Pennsylvania bar by motion, because New Jersey is 
not a reciprocal state.  As a result, this claim, too, fails.  
Accord Berch, 773 F.3d at 1046. 
 D. Dormant Commerce Clause  
 Appellants’ final argument is that Rule 204 violates 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.  We begin by asking whether 
the state law discriminates against interstate commerce on its 
face or in its purpose or effect.  See Heffner v. Murphy, 745 
F.3d 56, 72 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220 
(2014); Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk 
Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2006).  If it does, it is 
invalid unless it “serves a legitimate local purpose” that 
“could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means.”  Cloverland, 462 F.3d at 261 (quoting Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted).  “By contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations that 
have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid 
unless ‘the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”  Or. 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970)).       
 We agree with the District Court that Rule 204 “does 
not discriminate against out-of-state commerce on its face, . . 
. [n]or is there other evidence that the purpose or effect of the 
Rule is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state 
interests.”  Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of 
Multijurisdictional Practice (NAAMJP) v. Castille, 66 F. 
18 
 
Supp. 3d 633, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  Again, Rule 204 does not 
classify applicants based on residence.  Further, any 
incidental effect on interstate commerce of declining to admit 
by motion attorneys barred in nonreciprocal states is 
mitigated by the existence of alternative means of admission, 
i.e., taking the Pennsylvania bar exam, and any such effect is 
not “clearly excessive” in relation to Pennsylvania’s interests 
in regulating its bar and securing favorable treatment for 
Pennsylvania-barred attorneys.  Moreover, Rule 204 
“arguably promotes some [interstate] commerce” because it 
permits admission by motion for attorneys barred in thirty-
eight states and the District of Columbia, thus facilitating 
their admission in Pennsylvania.  Berch, 773 F.3d at 1049.  It 
therefore does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s Order.4 
                                              
 4 Because we reject each of Appellants’ claims, we 
need not decide whether Appellees are entitled to legislative 
immunity. 
